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JUR1SD1T1QN OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sect 78A-4103(2)(e) and Rules 3 and 4 of Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
ISSUE #1:

Did the District Court commit reversible error in allowing the case to go to

the jury when the State failed to establish any misleading statements made by the defendant
that could be made not misleading by any of the alleged omissions the State presented to the
jury, and further, did the court also err by submitting the case when the State failed to present
any evidence of an offer, sale or purchase of a security for value. This issue is discussed
under Point One of the Argument.
Standard of Review: This is an issue of law reviewed for correctness. See State v.
MacGuire, 2004 UT4, 84 P.3d 1171 (2004)
Preservation of the issue: The issue was preserved in the Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss and was also argued at the close of the State's case, Trial Transcript ("T") pp. 296299). It was also argued in Closing Argument (T.p. 372 - 396) and on the Motion to Arrest
Judgment.
ISSUE #2:

Did the District Court commit reversible error in allowing the State's

expert, Mr. Hines, the Director of Enforcement for the Utah Division of Securities, present to
the jury an impermissible legal conclusion that the stock certificates given to Mr. Young and
Mr. Myers was security? This issue is discussed under Point Two of the Argument.
Standard of Review: "The determination as to who qualifies as an expert witness and
the admissibility of the witness's testimony fall[s] within the discretion of the trial court," which
l

will not be reversed "[a]bsent a clear abuse of this discretion." Evan ex rel. Evans v. Lanqston.
2007 UT. App. 240, 166 P.3d 621 (2007) (first alteration in original).
Preservation of the Issue: This issue was preserved at the trial. (T.pp. 100,1149 and
360) and the Motion to Arrest Judgment.
ISSUE #3:

Did the District Court commit reversible error in allowing the State to

present the jury an incorrect view of the law in violation of defendant's constitutional right to
due process, and making the application of the statute constitutionally vague, as applied to
defendant, and in violation of the constitutional separation of powers clause? This issue is
discussed under Point Three of the Argument.
Standard of Review: The Supreme Court held "[cjonstitutional challenges to statutes
present questions of law, which we review for correctness." Provo City Corp. v. Thompson,
2004 UT 14, 86 P.3d 735 (Utah 2004) citing State v. Herrera, 1999 UT 64,114 n.2, 993 P.2d
854.
Preservation of the Issue: This issue was preserved in the Motion to Dismiss. (T.pp.
296-299 and the Motion to Arrest Judgment.
1SSUE#4 Did the District Court commit reversible error when it allowed the following
irrelevant, inflammatory and prejudicial evidence to go to the jury:
A. The evidence of the $50,000 trust deed executed in October, 2000, at least two
Months, after the alleged stock sale agreement. The trust deed had nothing to do with the
August 9, 2000 alleged stock sale agreement.

1

MR. HARMON: Your Honor, again I'd like to pose an objection .. .(Discuss at the bench off the record). The

State continued to question about an IPO after the objection.

B.

The evidence that defendant promised to pay for 200 cows which were delivered

at least a month after the alleged stock sale agreement. Defendant's alleged promise was not
part of the August 9, 2000 alleged stock sale agreement, therefore it was irrelevant to the
alleged stock sale agreement.
C. The State's expert testimony of an IPO where the entire transaction did not involve
an IPO.
This issue #4 is discussed under Point Four of the Argument.
Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion by the trial court, State v. Bisner. 2001 UT 99,
37P.3d 1073(2001).
Preservation of the Issue: Issue was preserved in the Motion for Arrest of Judgment.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, CODE SECTIONS AND RULES
The provisions of the controlling law; constitution, statutes, and rules are attached in the
Addendum:
Utah Constitution, Article V, Section 1
Utah Constitution Article VI, Section 1
Utah Code Ann. §61-1-1

Utah Code Ann. §61-1-1(2)
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-405
Utah Code Ann. §78A-4-2-103(2)(e)
Rule 3, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure:
Rule 4, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence

Rule 704, Utah Rules of Evidence
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This case represents perhaps the best reason why the judiciary is an independent
branch of the government to guard and protect ordinary citizens from aggressive and
overreaching enforcement of the laws by the executive branch ("State"). The defendant, A.
Paul Schwenke, was charged with violating Utah Code Ann. §61-1-1(2) commonly referred to
as "security fraud". This statute prohibits anyone from offering, selling or purchasing security
using untrue statements of material facts, or making misleading statements of material fact
and omitting to state material facts necessary to make the misleading statements actually
made, not misleading. But rather than establishing a violation of the statute charged, the
State claimed that Schwenke was a promoter and control person of American Dairy.com and
he had a duty to disclose everything a "reasonable prudent investor would want to know before
they make their decision in purchasing." TT p.90. Because Schwenke allegedly failed to make
at least twenty disclosures that a "reasonable prudent investor" would want to know, the State
claimed that Schwenke committed security fraud. The State's view of the statute is clearly
wrong.
Based on this erroneous view of the law, the State presented the jury with some twenty
disclosures that Schwenke allegedly failed to make to Mr. Young and Mr. Myers. That is the
entirety of the State's security fraud claim. The plain meaning of §651-1-1(2) is a prohibition
against (1) offering, selling or purchasing a security and telling untrue statements of material
facts, or (2) telling misleading statements of material facts and omitting to tell material facts
4

that would make the misleading statements made, not misleading. Because of the State's
erroneous view of the law, it failed to show any misleading statements of material fact actually
made by Schwenke, and instead, told the jury that Schwenke failed to disclose to Mr. Young
and Mr. Myers at least twenty facts that a reasonable prudent investor would have wanted to
know. The State's erroneous view of the law presented to the jury by its expert witness, Mr.
Hines, a member of the executive branch, resulted in Schwenke's wrongful conviction and
imprisonment. Accordingly, the Honorable Court is respectfully urged to correct the injustice
inflicted on Schwenke and promptly reverse his wrongful conviction.
Procedural History.
Schwenke and co-defendant, Jamis Johnson, were charged by Criminal Information on
April 4, 2005. The Information was later amended on October 24, 2005. The Amended
Information charged Schwenke and Johnson with one count of securities fraud in violation of
Utah Code Ann. §61-1-1, and one count of theft by deception in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§76-6-405. Following a preliminary hearing, both Schwenke and Johnson were bound over for
trial on both charges. Upon motion by co-defendant Johnson, the cases were severed and
proceeded to trial separately. Later, upon the State's stipulation, the charge of theft by
deception in violation of §76-6-405 was dismissed. Schwenke then filed a Motion to Dismiss
the charges because, among other grounds, the State had not stated any misleading
statements of material facts actually made by Schwenke, and the State's view of the statute
was erroneous. The Motion to Dismiss was renewed at the end of the State's case wherein
the State opposed by arguing its erroneous view of the law:
[GUNNARSON]:

. . .He [Schwenke] argued that there were no predicate statements. I
5

think we've had abundant testimony as to predicate statements and the fact of
obligations of disclosures, the fact that he was a promoter and the fact (inaudible)
even a promoter that put upon him the duty of all disclosures, which he
breached. The fact that he didn't - he brought up subjects such as risk
[THE COURT] Well, promoter is not a defined term in the statute.
[GUNNARSON] No, but (inaudible) definition that he's a control person, and a control
person has that according to Mr. Hines [THE COURT] Well, there's no - control person is not a defined thing in the statute,
either.
[GUNNARSON] Well, true, but then the expert testimony has been that (inaudible) if
he is a control person and a promoter, and they have that duty to disclose.
Beyond that, Mr. Hines has testified, and it's obvious for the jury that there is an
opening of the door when he talked about risk. Once you talk about risk you
better tell all the risks, and that includes conflicts, that includes background. That
includes the risk of the IPO. As a matter of fact, the IPO was, in Hines' opinion,
very probably would not have been granted, and that's something they should
have been told. So by opening the door and talking about the IPO, he has to tell
them the risks involved.
[THE COURT] Go ahead, Mr. Schwenke.
[SCHWENKE] I think it's interesting to hear all these terms being put forth. I think the
statute is pretty clear as to what is needed to be proven here, number one, there
should be a sale as they allege of American Dairy stock by me, the defendant, to
Mr. Young and Mr. Myers. I believe the evidence does not show that I made that
sale. More importantly, the second element, not once [THE COURT] Who made the sale then if vou didn't?2
[SCHWENKE] Well, the sale was as I believe the evidence was confirmed here, there
was idea there for a corporation to be formed for the farmers, and the farmers
owned it and the farmers -[THE COURT] Well, but it was your idea, wasn't it?
[SCHWENKE] Correct, it was my idea. But there was no sale.
[THE COURT] This wouldn't have all took place if it hadn't been for you.
[SCHWENKE] Well, absolutely. As a matter of fact, it shouldn't even come to place
even right now at all, but I think what we really need to look at here is how easy
the statute is. It's not that complicated. It does not say anything at all about a
promoter. It doesn't say nothing about a control person. It says that I, the
defendant, made a material misrep [THE COURT] Well, first of all, you made an untrue statement, and -1 think they
haven't pointed out any untrue statement, other than - you know, I guess - you
know, I guess it's arguable, but ~
[SCHWENKE] Except, your honor, I believe just from the plain meaning of the second
2

The Court apparently already concluded, erroneously, that the issuance of American Dairy.com stock to Mr.
Young and Mr. Meyers was a "security transaction".

element that we're talking about here, they have the option to show untrue
statements or the second option. The fact that they relied on omissions, they means that they have not relied on untrue statements. They have elected to use
omissions, which is the second option on that second element - omissions. I
believe the language is clear enough that says, "omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make a statement made not misleading," That means they
must put on evidence that I made misleading statements.
[THE COURT] No. No. That's not what it says.
[SCHWENKE] Well [THE COURT] It's that you omitted to make statements - material statements that in
light of the - under the conditions that you made them, whatever statement they
have, that there was low risk or that you were going to have an IPO, and [SCHWENKE] W h a t [THE COURT] They're alleging the fact that you omitted to give, I guess, background
of yourself and Mr. Johnson, that that would - something that would be important
if there was going to be a successful IPO, or if there was - if this - the
associated risk with them making this transaction.
[SCHWENKE] I understand what you're saying, your Honor, but if I could just make
one more response to that. It's omit to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made. So that means there has to be a statement made.
[THE COURT] That's true, there has to be a statement made.
[SCHWENKE] And then the omission would make that statement not misleading.
[THE COURT]

Uh-huh. That's right.

TTpp. 296-299.
The case was presented to the jury; notwithstanding, the Court agreed that the State did
not show any untrue statements, and agreed also that the State had to prove misleading
statements of material fact and omissions of material facts necessary to make those
misleading statements, not misleading. The jury convicted defendant on April 4, 2007. The
Court denied defendant's Motion to Arrest Judgment. Defendant was sentenced to 0 to 5
years in prison. The Notice of Appeal was filed on August 16, 2007. On February 13, 2008,
the case was remanded to the District Court to appoint new counsel. Mr. James K. Slaven,
Esq. was appointed counsel to represent Appellant on this appeal. Mr. Slaven filed a motion to
remand the case to the District Court for a hearing to establish evidence critical to the defense
7

that were not produced at the trial as a result of ineffective assistance of counsel. This court
denied the remand motion on September 12, 2008. Please see in the Addendum a copy of
the order with copies of some of the documentary evidence that would have been produced if
the remand was granted.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
1.

Mr. Ronald Myers and Mr. James Young owned a dairy farm called Milk-King

Farm, LLC located at Delta, Utah. T.p. 118.
2.

Prior to the transaction, Mr. Myers and Mr.Young had a substantial loan with

Central Bank with the dairy and land as collateral. T. pp. 116-7.
3.

In or about July, 2000, a Mr. Duane Bitton, a cattle seller and broker, introduced

Mr. Young to Schwenke at a meeting in Fillmore, Utah. T.p. 119.
4.

Just prior to that meeting, the American Dairy.com, a Utah corporation, had been

incorporated by attorney Victor Lawrence. American Dairy.com had never engaged in any
business prior to August 9, 2000 and had no bank or checking accounts. T. pp. 315-320.
5.

At the Fillmore meeting, Schwenke outlined a proposal for several dairies to

combine and join a newly formed corporation. Each dairy that joined the corporation would be
cleaned, painted and Internet equipment installed so the dairy and its operations could be
viewed over the Internet. When a sufficient number of dairies joined the corporation, the
corporation could be a viable entity to take to the stock market and raise funds for the
participating dairy farmers. T. pp. 121-123.
6.

Another meeting occurred on or about August 2, 2000 at the office of attorney

Victor Lawrence in Salt Lake City, Utah. Mr. Young, Mr. Myers, Schwenke and Mr. Lawrence
8

were present, and at some point, Schwnke, Young and Myers went downstairs to the separate
office of Mr. Jamis Johnson. T.p.132.
7.

At the August 2, 2000 meeting, Lawrence's draft of an Agreement was reviewed.

T. pp. 134 to 135.
8.

The Agreement generally transferred title of the dairy and farming equipment

from Mr. Young and Mr. Myers' Milk King Dairy, LLC to American Dairy.com Corporation, for
100% of the outstanding stock which totaled 200,000 shares. At the time of the Agreement,
Mr. Young and Mr. Myer thus became the only shareholders of American Dairy.com having
absolute ownership and control. T.p. 153 and pp. 239-240.
9.

Mr. Young did not recall who were present nor what was discussed at the August

2, 2000 meeting, but Myers testified that Mr. Johnson told him that he was an attorney with
securities expertise, that it was possible to have a public offering under Schwenke's plan with
15,000 cows and the stock could be offered at $4.00 to $8.00 a share. T.P. 227.
10.

Mr. Young and Mr. Myers desired to have this Agreement reviewed by their own

attorney so they took the draft Agreement to their attorney in Delta, Utah, for review and
advise. T.pp. 143-4 and 237.
11.

Mr. Young and Mr. Meyer's attorney made revisions to the initial draft which were

incorporated into the final draft. One revision was for Mr. Young and Mr. Myers to retain the
right to take back the dairy property and equipment out of American Dairy.com and release the
200,000 shares of stock of American Dairy.com. T.pp. 237-8 and 259.
12.

The parties met again on August 9, 2000. Mr. Young and Mr. Myers first met

Schwenke and Victor Lawrence to review the final draft. Mr. Young signed the Agreement on
9

behalf of Milk-King Farms, LLC, then the Agreement was taken to Mr Johnson's office where
he signed it on behalf of American Dairy.com. T.pp. 221 and 239.
13.

After the Agreement was signed, two stock certificates were prepared; one for

50,000 shares to Mr. Young and another for 150,000 shares to Mr. Myers pursuant to the
terms of the Agreement. T.p. 230.
14.

The testimony presented clearly demonstrated that Mr. Young and Mr. Myers

were the only shareholders of American Dairy.com, Inc. T.p. 181.
15.

In connection with the August 9, 2000 agreement, a warranty deed was executed

by Milk-King Farms, LLC conveying the title of the dairy farm to American Dairy.com. T.p.
239.
16.

Mr. Young continued to operate the dairy and to control all aspects of the dairy

operations. Mr. Young continued to maintain the bank accounts and collect all income. T. pp.
182, 196-7 and 264.
17.

The State without alleging any misleading statements by Schwenke, claimed that

defendant failed to make the following disclosures to Mr. Young and Mr. Meyers in connection
with the August 9, 2000 Agreement:

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)

".. actual risk factors involved in the venture . ." See T.pp. 91-92
". .minimum capitalization or the minimum amount of money you need to collect
to make this business work. . ." See T.p. 92
" what happen to the money if minimum capitalization isn't reached." See T.p. 92.
the financial statements .." See T.pp. 92 and 125
history of the principals of the company..." See T.p. 92
. history of the control person . . . " See T.pp. 92-93
. competition in the market. .." See T.p. 93
. the background of the CEO . . ."See T.pp. 94 and 125
. that there are no financials . . ." See TT p. 96
. history of any civil litigation, criminal litigation, regulatory administrative
10

(11).
(12).
(13).
(14).
(15).
(16).
(17).
(18).
(19).

actions of control person. ." See TT pp. 96 and 151.
".. .tax lien [of control person]. .." See T.pp. 97, and 147,
Control persons disbarment
See T.p. 101
Judgment against Jamis Johnson See T.p. 147
Federal tax lien against defendant. See T.p.148, 264 and Exh#12
Tax lien against Jamis Johnson. See T.p. 150 and Exhs 13, 14 &15
Jamis Johnson's bar problem. See T.p.231
Defendant's disbarment. See T.p. 231, pp.272-274
Johnson and Schwenke tax liens. See T.pp,231, 246, 264, & 266
Notice of Default in MNSTR case Exhibit #16

(20). Giffen judgment against defendant. See T.pp 77-78, 146-155
18.

Mr. Young testified that Schwenke did not make any misleading statements. See

T.pp. 194-195.
19.

Mr. Myers testified that Schwenke did not make any misleading statements. See

T.p. 266.
20.

Mr. Hine, the State's expert witness, admitted that the testimony of Mr. Young

and Mr. Myers were that Schwenke did not make any misleading statements. See T.pp. 289290.
21.

Mr. Hine testified that the stock certificates made for Mr. Young and Mr. Myers

were security. See T.pp. 84-85, 286-288.
22.

Mr. Young testified and confirmed that the transaction was a change of their form

of ownership from a LLC to a corporation. See T.p. 145.
23.

Mr. Young and Mr. Myers confirmed that the plan was for several dairy farms to

eventually join, and only when enough farmers joined would there be an effort to pursue any
IPO. See T.pp. 121-122, 174 -176, and 257-258.
24.

Mr. Young continued to control and operate his farm and collect all income and

pay expenses as he has always done prior to the Agreement. See T.p. 182. The only change
n

was that the dairy was cleaned, painted and equipped with Internet server, a website and
cameras for it to be viewed live over the Internet. See T.pp. 189-190.
25.

The State falsely claimed that Schwenke was the control person and promoter,

and as such had the duty to make the disclosures listed above in paragraph 28. See T.p. 90.
26.

The State claimed that Schwenke took out a loan of $50,000.00 secured with

the farm, and pocketed the money. See T.pp. 163, 277-278. Mr. Young stated that he had no
knowledge if there was a $50,000.00 note, nor was there any money disbursed on the trust
deed. See T.p. 187.
27.

But for, ineffective assistance of counsel, bank records and testimony from PDN

Investments would have established that only $12,500.00 was actually funded on the loan.
And notwithstanding, Mr. Young's denial of the loan, he personally received $7,000.00 and the
balance of $5,500.00 was paid on a $15,000 bill from cSave.net, LLC that cleaned, painted the
dairy farm, and provided, and installed the internet server, website and cameras throughout
the dairy3 as confirmed by Mr. Young at trial. See T.pp. 189-190. After the August 9, 2000
agreement, the State claimed that Schwenke told Mr. Young to buy 200 cows for the farm and
Schwenke would pay for the cows. See T.p. 192.
28.

While Mr. Young claims that Schwenke was supposed to pay for the cows, he

acknowledged that Schwenke did not promise, nor had any obligation under the August 9,
2000 agreement to buy cows. See T.p. 192.
29.

3

According to the State, within 30 days after the August 9, 2000

Appellant was denied a remand to establish evidence of the loan including copies of the disbursement checks
issued to Young and cSave.net The order denying remand and copies of the checks to Mr. Young and csave.net
are provided in Addendum.
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agreement, the cows were delivered to the farm, and during the next 30 days the cows were
repossessed. See T.pp. 243-244.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
This brief provides legal arguments for reversal of Schwenke's conviction. Schwenke
demonstrates under Point One that the State failed to establish a case for security fraud under
the plain meaning of the statute, Utah Code Ann. §61-1-1 (2). The statute requires the State to
first prove statements of material facts that Schwenke actually made ["statements made"]
which were misleading. Then second, the State must prove omitted statements of material
facts ["omitted statements"] that Schwenke did not make, but should have made to render the
misleading statements made, not misleading. Instead of following the statute, the State
argued that Schwenke was a control person and a promoter of American Dairy.com, and as
such, he had a duty to disclose all information a "reasonable prudent investor would want to
know before they make their decision in purchasing." T.p.90. Based on the State's departure
from of the statute, it presented the jury with at least twenty disclosures that it claimed
Schwenke failed to make. The State, however, failed to establish any misleading statements
made by Schwenke that could be rendered not misleading, by any of the alleged 20 omissions.
Moreover, the stock transactions must be for value according to the definition of a
security transaction under §61-1-1. Rather than an exchange for value, the State's witness Mr.
Young testified that his receipt of 100% of the outstanding stock of American Dairy.com stock
was merely a change of the form of their company from a limited liability company to a
corporation. No money changed hands. Mr. Young testified that he and Mr. Myers maintained
control of their equipment and dairy, the bank accounts, the milk receipts, etc, like they had
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always done when their dairy was Milk King Dairy, LLC. Schwenke had no stock, had no
control, neither received any money or property and made no misleading statements.
Under Point Two, it is shown that the State's expert, Mr. Hines improperly opined and
provided the jury with a legal conclusion that the stock of American Dairy.com that was
provided to Mr. Young and Mr. Myers under the August 9, 2000 agreement was "security" for
purposes of the security fraud statute. Mr. Hine's impermissible legal conclusion is ground for
the court to reverse defendant's conviction, and the court is respectfully urged to do so.
Under Point Three, it is shown that the State's expert repeatedly stated the wrong
version of the statute as requiring disclosures of all information a reasonable prudent investor
would want to know rather than the limited disclosures required under the plain meaning of the
statute. By prosecuting its own version of the law rather than as enacted by the Legislature,
the State has violated defendant's constitutional right to due process. The State's prosecution
of its own version of the statute is also a violation of the separation of power clause of the
constitution. These constitutional violations resulted in Schwenke's wrongful conviction and
the court is respectfully urged to correct this injustice and reverse and set aside Schwenke's
conviction.
Under Point Four, it is shown that the conviction could have been the result of the State
presenting irrelevant, false inflammatory and highly prejudicial evidence. Schwenke was
charged with security fraud resulting from an alleged offer, sale or purchase of a security. The
basis for the charge is an agreement executed by and between Milk King Dairy, LLC and
American Dairy.com, on August 9, 2000. Accordingly, any alleged fraud in connection with this
agreement must have occurred on or before August 9, 2000. Any fraud after August 9, 2000
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would have had no bearing or relevance to the August 9, 2000 transaction. The two most
inflammatory and highly prejudicial events in evidence presented to the jury, did not occur until
long after the Agreement was entered into on August 9, 2000; therefore, they were irrelevant to
the alleged security fraud charge. Moreover, the State's irrelevant claims were both
misrepresented and were untrue.
The first claim was that Schwenke borrowed and kept for himself $50,000.00 using the
dairy farm as collateral. The only evidence of the alleged loan was a 2 nd trust deed for
$50,000.00 dated October 4, 2000. There was no evidence of a note, nor was there any
evidence that the note was funded, and if it was funded, who received the proceeds. More
importantly, the alleged debt occurred two months after August 9, 2000, the date of the alleged
stock sale agreement. Accordingly, the alleged loan had no bearing on the alleged security
fraud and should not have been presented to the jury. The prejudice from this untrue evidence
is devastating that it must have caused the jury to wrongfully convict Schwenke.
The second is the claim that Schwenke promised to pay for 200 cows delivered to the
dairy about 30 days after the August 9, 2000 agreement. There was no evidence that
Schwenke had any legal obligation to pay for the cows; accordingly, even if he had promised
to pay for them, it is not a crime, rather it was a promise without consideration.4 More
importantly, the claim had no bearing or connection to the August 9, 2000 agreement.
Additionally, the State's expert witness gave highly inflammatory testimony about an
IPO. There was never an IPO; therefore, the testimony was irrelevant and very prejudicial.
4

If a remand was granted, Schwenke would have shown that Young and Myers sold all the calves and the
cows, making in excess of $70,000.00, kept all the milk proceeds in excess of $20,000.00 and did not pay the
feed suppliers.
15

Indeed, most of alt the testimony as to the lack of alleged disclosures was incorrectly
presented as necessary disclosures in connection with an IPO in process. The evidence was
very clear that Schwenke at no time was marketing or selling an IPO or Initial Public Offering.
ARGUMENT
Point One
The State failed to establish a case of security fraud under the plain
meaning of the statute, Utah Code Ann, §61-1-1(2),
Schwenke was charged, convicted and imprisoned for violation of Utah Code §61-1-1(2)
which provides, in relevant parts as follows:
It is unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of any
security, directly or indirectly t o : . . (2) make any untrue statement of a material fact or
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statement made, in light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading. (Emphasis added).
The correct interpretation of this statute is at issue because the entirety of the State's case, as
shown below, is outside the purview of the statute. This court can review this statute for
correctness as a question of law. State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 796 (Utah 1991). Ward v.
Richfield, 798 P.2d 757, 759 (Utah 1990). It is well settled that when faced with a question of
statutory construction, the court must first examine the plain language of the statute. Shultz v.
BMAofN.Am. Inc., 814 P.2d 1108, 1112, (Utah 1991); Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 500
(Utah 1989) (per curium).
Under the plain language rule, §61-1-1(2) is clear and unambiguous that the State must
establish proof beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) Schwenke engaged in an offer, sale or
purchase of a security, and (2) made untrue statement of material fact, OR made a misleading
statement of material fact, and omitted to make a statement of material fact necessary to make
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the misleading statement made, not misleading. The entirety of the State's case was based on
the alleged "sale" of American Dairy.com stock, and Schwenke's alleged failure to make
several disclosures including disclosures of personal information about himself and Mr. James
Johnson. As shown next under Section A, all the disclosures that the State claimed that
Schwenke failed to make, are not disclosures required to be made under the statute
Following, under Section B, it is shown that the State failed to establish an offer, sale, or
purchase of a security by Schwenke for value.
A.

The State failed to establish any misleading statements by Schwenke let
alone any that would be made not misleading by the alleged omissions.

The State presented Exhibit #12, a Federal tax lien against Schwenke; Exhibits #13,
#14, and #15, tax liens against Mr. Johnson; Exhibit #16 is a notice of default in a civil case by
MNSTR against Schwenke and Mr. Johnson; a civil judgment by a Mr. Giffen allegedly against
Schwenke and Mr. Johnson. See T.pp. 77-78 and pp. 146-155. Additionally, the State
claimed that with regard to American Dairy.com, a newly formed corporation that has never
operated, had no assets nor officers or directors, Schwenke failed to provide financial
statements, its financial status, or its board of directors. See T.p. 125. These tax liens,
lawsuits, judgments, financial statements, board of directors and risks are among several
disclosures that the government claimed were required to be made by the Schwenke under the
above statute. Through Mr. Myers, the State re-emphasized Schwenke's alleged failure to
disclose tax liens, See T.p. 264; and the alleged risk that Schwenke was disbarred in 1989,
and has a half million tax lien, and civil judgments. See T.pp. 272 -274. Indeed, the State's
case is wholly based on Schwenke's failure to make at least 20 disclosures as set forth in
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paragraph 28 of the Statement of Facts above.
The State, however, failed to establish what misleading statements of material facts did
Schwenke make that would be made not misleading by any of the numerous alleged omitted
statements. In fact, the State's witnesses, including its expert witness, all agreed that there
were no misleading statements made by Schwenke. Mr. Young admitted that Schwenke did
not make any misleading statements:
Q:

A:
Q:

A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:

A:

[SCHWENKE]. . .Now can you tell me what misleading statement did I make
that would be made not misleading by the notice of federal tax lien against
me. What statement did I make? What misleading statement did I make
that would be made not misleading by giving you the information about the
federal tax lien?
[YOUNG] I don't remember you making a statement about that.
[SCHWENKE]. . Exhibit #12 is a lien against-- a federal tax lien - - t a x lien
against Mr. Johnson. Now isn't it true that I did not make any misleading
statement that would be made not misleading by that information - - by
that tax lien?
[YOUNG] I don't remember you making any statement about your solvency or
not, other than saying you had investors available.
[SCHWENKE] Okay. So your testimony is you don't remember that defendant
making any misleading statement to you?
[YOUNG] that's
[SCHWENKE] That would be make - [YOUNG] That's true
[SCHWENKE] - - not misleading. All right. Now Exhibit #14 is a similar thing,
another tax lien against Mr. Jamis Johnson. Now again what misleading
statement did me, the defendant, say to you that would be made not
misleading by that tax lien against Mr. Johnson?
[YOUNG]

Nothing, that I remember.

See T.pp. 194-195. (Emphasis added). Mr. Myers also admitted that Schwenke did not make
any misleading statements of material facts that could be made not misleading by the alleged
omissions.
Q:

[SCHWENKE] Now again, see if you can remember - - think back. What
statement - - misleading statement did I make to you that would be made
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A:

not misleading by the information that was not told you?
[MYERS] It was just the absence of disclosures.

See T.p. 266. (Emphasis added). Even the State's expert witness admitted that the witnesses
did not give any misleading statements of material facts made by defendant. On cross
examination, the State's expert, Mr. Hines, confirmed the lack of misleading statements.
Q:

A:
Q:
A:

Q:
A:

Q:
A:

[HARMON] In the testimony that you heard, was there ever any testimony that
you would treat as a misleading statement that Mr. Schwenke made in
connection with the sale of this stock?
[HINES] Yes
[HARMON] Could you tell what misleading statement he made?
[HINES] I remember the - - well, if my memory is correct, Mr. Schwenke - okay, now let me correct that. The testimony was that Mr. Johnson was
introduced as an attorney.
[HARMON] Yes
[HINES] And that fact actually was true at the time. He was under disciplinary
action. Now I remember. Now I remember the testimony that Mr.
Schwenke said that he had been an attorney and that he no longer was
practicing law and was doing this for a business, so let me correct myself
on that. I don't remember that misstatement.
[HARMON] Okay. So did you hear, then, any misstatement made by Schwenke
to either Mr. Myers or Mr. Young?
[HINES] I don't remember any misstatements that Mr. Schwenke made.

See T.pp. 289 -290. (Emphasis added).
Under the plain meaning of the statute, the State has two ways to prove its case. The
State can prove its case under the first prong of the statute by establishing untrue statements
of material facts made by Schwenke or under the second prong, the State can prove its case
by proving two statements: one made, and one omitted. Under the second prong, the State
must prove the first statement which is a statement of material fact actually made by the
defendant, then the State much prove the second statement which is a statement of material
fact the defendant omitted to make. With at least 20 alleged omissions, it is clear that the
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State elected to use the second prong, based on alleged omissions of material facts, to
establish its case of security fraud.5 Accordingly, the State must prove a statement made and
the statement omitted.
What is the statement made by the defendant? To answer that question we
need to look at the purpose the statute provides for the State to prove the second or omitted
statement. The statute is clear that the omitted statement would make the first statement
actually made, not misleading. It follows, therefore, that the first statement must be a
misleading statement that the second and omitted statement would make not misleading.
Therefore, to prove its case, the State must first establish a misleading statement actually
made by the defendant. Only after establishing that misleading statement can the State then
prove the second statement which is the one the defendant failed to make, but should have
made, to make the first and misleading statement, not misleading.
The State clearly failed to establish the first statement as admitted to by its witnesses
including its expert. Both Mr. Young and Mr. Myers admitted that defendant did not make any
misleading statements. The State's expert Mr. Hines also confirmed that neither Mr. Young
nor Mr. Myers stated any misleading statements made by Schwenke.
Q;
A:

[HARMON] Okay. So did you hear, then, any misstatement made by Schwenke
to either Mr. Myers or Mr. Young?
[HINES] I don't remember any misstatements that Mr. Schwenke made.

See T.p. 290. (Emphasis added). Because no misleading statement of material facts made
by Schwenke had been identified and established, all alleged omissions are left hanging

5

The Court also acknowledged that the State did not prove any untrue statements: "I think that they haven't

pointed out any untrue statement,.." T.p. 298.
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without any statement actually made by Schwenke to attach to. That is a gaping hole in the
State's case. Without misleading statements of material facts that could be made not
misleading by omissions alleged by the State, there could not be a violation of the statute by
Schwenke as charged. Accordingly, this court is respectfully urged to do what is right and
relieve Schwenke from the injustice wrongfully inflicted upon him.
B.

The State failed to establish an offer, sale, or purchase of a security for
value by the Schwenke.

As quoted above, §61-1-1 requires that the State must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that Schwenke engaged in an offer, sale or purchase of a security for value.
Accordingly, there can be no crime of security fraud unless the defendant offered, sold or
purchased any security for value. What is a security? The State charged that the stock of
American Dairy.com provided Mr. Young and Mr. Myers under the August 9, 2000 agreement
was security as contemplated in the statute.
Q:
A:

Q:

A:

[GUNNARSON] What is - - what makes a stock a security?
[HINES]... For a transaction to be a security that's called
stock, it requires normal characteristics of stock. Those normally are the
right to vote, the ability to hypothecate or lend against the stock that you
now possess, your right to participate in dividends if they're ever offered,
and the ability of that stock to be able to appreciate in value.
[GUNNARSON] So in your opinion, if I were to show you a document and
have someone testify, "l took this stock certificate anticipating profit and I
had the right to vote," would those be indications of a stock, a true
security?
[HINES] Yes. The general presumption in the industry is that the stock
certificate normally is a security, almost always, it's a very rare
circumstance in which stock is held not to be a security. But your
question was if you have the stock certificate and you have some testify of
the norma! characteristics of stock, then yes, that transaction is a security.

See T.pp. 84-85. (Emphasis added).
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Notwithstanding, the State's claim that the American Dairy.com stock certificates held
by Mr. Young and Mr. Myers were securities, they were not, as a matter of law. The United
States Supreme Court held that the economic reality6 test is the linchpin of securities analysis.
United House Foundation v. Foreman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S.
332, 336 (1967). This view was also followed recently by a federal court cautioning that "in
searching for the meaning and scope of the word 'security'... the emphasis should be on
economic reality." Stechler v. Sidley, Austin, Brow & Wood, LLF, 382 F. Supp. 2d 580
(S.D.N.Y. 2005). Accordingly, Mr. Young and Mr. Myer's receipt of American Dairy.com stock
under the August 9, 2000 agreement must be reviewed for its economic reality to determine if
the transaction constituted a sale of security.
The economic reality behind Mr. Young and Mr. Myer's ownership of American
Dairy.com stock under the August 9, 2000 agreement is a mere change of form of the dairy
operation from the limited liability company to a corporation. Mr. Young confirmed that the
transaction in this case was merely a change of form.
Q:
A:

[GUNNARSON] Was it your desire to merely change the form of ownership
of your dairy farm, put it from an LLC to a corporation?
[YOUNG] Yeah, I guess so. That's what we were trying to do.

See T.p. 145. (Emphasis added). Moreover, Mr. Young and Mr. Meyer confirmed that the
plan was for several dairy farms to participate in the corporation, and when enough signed up,
the corporation could become a viable company to take to the stock market.
Q:

6

[GUNNARSON] What did Mr. Schwenke tell you his concept of American
Dairy.com was?

Please note that the State wrongfully argued to the jury that the "economic reality" test does not apply in this
case: "you do not apply the economy reality. . . if you have stock that meets the normal characteristics of stock
that we talked about, then the transaction is a security." See T.p. 364.
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A:

[YOUNG] He said he ultimately wanted to get to 10 or 15,000 cows, several
dairies, and basically form a publically traded company.

See T.pp. 121-122. (Emphasis added).
Q:

A:
Q:
A:

[SCHWENKE]... Now you testified today that the plan that was explained at
the meeting in Fillmore was for several of these struggling farmers like
your farm, would get together and join in the corporation; is that correct?
[YOUNG] Well, they didn't have to be struggling, but Yes.
[SCHWENKE] Okay. The idea was not one farm but several farms to - [YOUNG] Yes

See T.p.174 (Emphasis added).
Q:
A:
Q:

A;
Q;

A:

[SCHWENKE] Now - - so the plan was not one farm like your farm but several
farmers to come together under the corporation?
[YOUNG] Yes.
[SCHWENKE] If there are enough farmers that are able to come in and join
this corporation, then this corporation could become a viable company to
take to the stock market; wasn't that the plan?
[YOUNG] Yes.
[SCHWENKE] So this idea of the IPO was something that would happen - would take place under this plan only after there's enough farmers join the
corporation; is that correct?
[YOUNG] rm sure - - that was one of the reguirements, one of the things that
we needed to do before the IPO.

See T.pp. 175-176 (Emphasis added).
Q:
A;
Q:
A;
Q:
A:

Q:

[SCHWENKE] So you agree, then, there was intention or at least part of
the plan is to have more than one dairy?
[MYERS] Oh definitely. I mean there was no way the stock would ever be
worth anything with just our dairy alone.
[SCHWENKE] You testified here earlier that it was only intended for your
dairy to go public.
[MYERS] No, no, no. If that was the impression, that's false
[SCHWENKE] In fact - [MYERS] It would - - to do a public offering, it would have been that the stock
was going to go. It wasn't that my dairy was going to a public off - - the
American Dairy.com stock. When value that that American Dairy had
would have been what would have gone public, in my opinion. I don't
understand stock.
[SCHWENKE] You do believe then that was something that was an
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A:
Q:

A;

objective to accomplish in the future that somehow we would hope that by
sometime in the future we would have enough cows, enough farms joining
the corporation here, then we'll look into going into a public offering; is that
correct?
[MYERS] Yes
[SCHWENKE] So this idea of the IPO was something that would happen - would take place under this plan only after there's enough farmers join the
corporation; is that correct?
[MYERS] That would be cor - - that would be correct.

See T.pp. 257-258. (Emphasis added).
Under the plan, American Dairy.com corporation would hold record title, but the farmers,
would continue to control and run their own dairy farms, keeping the cash flow, like they have
always had as confirmed by Mr. Young;
Q:

A:

[SCHWENKE] You continued to operate and control your farm and do
everything you had being doing with the farm for - - let me rephrase that.
At the meeting it was explained that the farmers would continue to own,
control - - to control and run, operate their own farms; is that correct?
[YOUNG] Yes

See T.p.182 (Emphasis added).
As the evidence confirms, the economic reality of the transaction in this case was
clearly a future plan for dairy farmers to join the corporate entity, American Dairy.com, and omy
when enough farmers participated and place their cows and farm assets into the corporation,
would the corporation prepare to enter the stock market and raise funds for the farmers. While
the corporation holds record title, each farmer retains actual control and run his own operations
as before. There was no change in the properties and dairy operations other that the dairies
would be cleaned and painted; an Internet server, a website and cameras installed, so the
dairies and their operations could be viewed live over the Internet. See T.pp. 189-190.
There simply was no offer, sale or purchase of American Dairy.com stock. The stock
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certificates held by Mr. and Mr. Myers under the August 9, 2000 agreement reflected that they
were the only shareholders and the plan was not yet a reality. If more farmers had participated
than the stock certificates would account for each farmer's interest in the corporation. As
confirmed by Mr. Young, and consistent with the future plan, he retained control and ran the
operations of his farm like he had always done prior to entering the August 9, 2000 agreement.
If the .com stock market had not crashed, and if a good number of farmers signed up with the
corporation, and American Dairy.com became a viable company to take to the stock market,
the farmers who own the corporation could install officers with immaculate reputations, retain a
reputable underwriter and expert market makers and take their corporation, American
Dairy.com, to the stock market to raise themselves money. But that part of the plan was well
into the future. That was the economic reality and the reason this venture was undertaken by
Schwenke.
Finally, the statute requires that the offer or sale must be for value. Mr. Young
confirmed that the transaction in this case was not a sale of stock for value, but instead, it was
a change in the form of ownership from a limited liability company, Milk King Dairy, LLC, to a
corporation, American Dairy.com.
Q;
A:

[GUNNARSON] Was it your desire to merely change the form of ownership
of your dairy farm, put it from an LLC to a corporation?
[YOUNG] Yeah, I guess so. Thaf s what we were trying to do.

See T.p. 145. (Emphasis added). There was no offer or sale of stock for value, but merely a
change of form from a limited liability company to a corporation. Yet, defendant has been
convicted and imprisoned for doing so. This court is respectfully urged to correct this injustice
and reverse Schwenke's wrongful conviction and order his freedom.
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Point Two
The State's expert witness gave impermissible legal opinion
Rules 702 through 704, Utah Rules of Evidence, controls the proper use and application
of expert testimonies. Rule 704 prohibits opinion testimonies that "tell the jury what result to
reach 'or' give legal conclusions." Davidson v. Prince. 813 P.2d 1225, 1230, 1231 (Ut. Ct App
1991) (Emphasis added), quoting Owen v. Kerr-McGee Corp. , 698 F.2d 236, 240 (5th Cir.
1983). See also State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421, 428 (Utah 1986) ["It is the duty of the judge
to instruct the jury on relevant law."]. Furthermore, there is "a danger that a juror may turn to
the [witness's legal conclusion] rather than the judge for guidance on the applicable law.
Steffenson v. Smith's Mgmt. Corp., 862 P.2d 1342, 1347 (Utah 1993), While there is no bright
line separating permissible and impermissible expert opinion testimonies, the Utah Supreme
court has provided guidance as to what is impermissible. See State v. Tennev, 913 P. 2d 750,
756 (Ut. Ct. App. 1996) [Concluding that admission of testimony was erroneous because
witnesses "tiefdl their opinions to the reguirements of Utah law" (Emphasis added)]; Davidson,
supra at 31-32 [Holding that trial court properly excluded, as impermissible conclusion
testimony that defendant was negligent.]; and State v. Stringham, 957 P.2d 602, 607-8 (Ut Ct.
App. 1998) [Holding that it was reversible error for the trial court to allow testimony by Internal
Revenue Service agent regarding the lawfulness of defendant's activities. (Emphasis added].
A recent illustration of this prohibition is found in State v. Davis, 155 P.3d 909 (Ut. Ct.
App. 2007). In that case, the applicable statute, in part, proscribed possession of a firearm.
The officer testified and offered an impermissible opinion that defendant had possession
because he admitted that his fingerprints would be on the gun.
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Q:
A.
Q:
A:

Q:
R:
A:

[PROSECUTOR]: Did [Davis1] own statements such as "my fingerprints will be
on [the gun], did that come to play?
[SEEGMILLER]: It did.
[PROSECUTOR]: Why is that?
[SEEGMILLER]: Well, this reference he made was spontaneous that his
fingerprints would be on it. My understanding of that statute is if his
fingerprints are on it that obviously means he had handled it.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection, your honor. His testifying what his
understanding of the statute is is inappropriate.
[THE COURT]: Overruled, Counsel. You brought it up in your cross. [The
prosecutor] has an opportunity to further explore it. . . .
[SEEGMILLER]: As he said they were on there, if they were, and they - he
says they were. His claim was, "You'll find my fingerprints", it's an
automatic that he had it in his hands. So that to us - our understanding
again of that is the possession is to hold and to have it in your hands
under your control, and that's what we went on.

Davis, supra (Emphasis added). Because of this testimony, the appeals court held that the
officer applied the fact that the defendant admitted his fingerprint would be on the gun, and
improperly reached a legal conclusion that the defendant had possession. Please also see
State v. Stringham, supra, where the IRS agent testified that the defendant assigned income,
than the agent concluded that the assignment was unlawful tax evasion. Like the Davis and
Stringham cases, Mr. Hines for the State, testified what a stock is and gave a legal conclusion
that the stock certificates given to Mr. Young and Mr. Myers were securities. Mr. Hines
testified as to what makes a stock certificate a security:
Q:
A:

Q:

[GUNNARSON] What is - - what makes a stock a security?
[HINES]... For a transaction to be a security that's called stock, it reguires
normal characteristics of stock. Those normally are the right to vote, the
ability to hypothecate or lend against the stock that you now possess, your
right to participate in dividends if they're ever offered, and the ability of that
stock to be able to appreciate in value.
[GUNNARSON] So in your opinion, if I were to show you a document and
have someone testify, "I took this stock certificate anticipating profit, and I
had the right to vote," would those be indications of a stock, a true
security.
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A:

[HINES] Yes. The general presumption in the industry is that the stock
certificate normally is a security, almost always, it's a very rare
circumstance in which stock is held not to be a security. But your question
was if you have the stock certificate and you have some of the normal
characteristics of stock, then yes, that transaction is a security.

See T.pp. 84-85. (Emphasis added). Mr. Hines concluded that the stock certificates in this
case is security:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:

[GUNNARSON]
So you've indicated a token, if you will, of securities is the
right to vote?
[HINES] Correct
[GUNNARSON] Was that present in this case?
[HINES] It appears it was, yes.
[GUNNARSON] The right to expect profit; was that present in this case?
[HINES] That is — I heard testimony to that effect, yes.
[GUNNARSON] Indications of ownership in the corporation; was that present
in this case?
[HINES] Well, certainly the stock certificate is indicia of owner - -the
fractionalized ownership of the corporation.

See T.p. 288 (Emphasis added).7 And more particularly, Mr. Hines concluded that Mr. Young
and Mr. Myers, the two farmers and the only holders of stock in American Dairy.com received
stock in a "security transaction":
Q:

A:

[GUNNARSON] Let me give you a hypothetical. Two farmers buy stock in
the corporation, and they were the - at that time (inaudible) they were the
only ones that held stock at the time. Would that still be a security
transaction?
[HINES] Oh certainly, It doesn't change. If they're the only one or there's a
million people, you still offered a security.

See T.p. 102 (Emphasis added)
The State's expert witness, Mr. Hines, like the witnesses in Davis and Stringham,
clearly applied the facts of the case and then rendered an impermissible legal conclusion. Mr.
7

Defense counsel timely objected to the impermissible legal opinion of the State's expert witness (See T.p.
283) preserving this issue for appeal. See Williams v. Bench, 2008 UT 822 (UtCt. App.).
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Hines testified that the two farmers (Mr. Young and Mr. Myer) bought stock of a corporation
(American Dairy.com), and the stock gave them the right to vote, expect profit, and ownership
of the corporation. Based on those facts, Mr. Hines rendered an impermissible legal
conclusion that the sale of the American Dairy.com stock was a "security transaction". Mr.
Hines repeatedly, throughout his testimony, told the jury that the stock certificates given to Mr.
Young and Mr. Myers were securities. Because the economic reality of the transaction in this
case does not support a finding of a sale of security, as a matter of law, Mr. Hine's
impermissible legal conclusion must have been the reason the jury convicted Schwenke.
Accordingly, Schwenke respectfully urged the honorable court to please correct the injustice
inflicted on him, and immediately reverse his wrongful conviction.
Point Three
The State violated the constitution by creating its own taw, rather than
applying Utah Code Ann. §61-1-1 as enacted by the legislature.

The law as charged, §61-1-1(2), is clear as to the scope of the disclosures that are
required. "It is unlawful for any person . . . to: . . . ( 2 ) . . . omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statement made, in light of the circumstances under which they
were made, not misleading." (Emphasis added). The provision is clear that the only
disclosures required are those material facts that would make any misleading statement of fact
actually made by Schwenke, not misleading. To comply with the plain meaning of the statute
requires the State to first establish misleading statements of material facts actually made by
Schwenke, then show statements of material facts not made or omitted by Schwenke, which
he should have made so as to render misleading statements that were made, not misleading.
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The State in this case clearly ignored the first requirement that the State must establish
misleading statements of material facts actually made by Schwenke. Instead, the State only
focused on the second part of the statute and listed at least twenty statements that Schwenke
allegedly omitted or failed to make.
The State claimed that Schwenke was a promoter and control person of American
Dairy.com, and as such, he had a duty to make numerous disclosures that a reasonable
prudent investor would want to know.
Q:

A:

[GUNNARSON] If a promoter who is significantly involved in the sales of the
corporation says, "Do you want to buy stock for I have stock to sell," would
that be considered a predicate statement?
[HINES] Yes. As soon as he opened the door by offering stock, the offer of
the stock is a predicate statement that requires the disclosure of all
material facts relative to that particular stock issue.

See T.p. 92-93 (Emphasis added). Please also see p. 93. What is a material fact? According
to the State, a material fact is a fact any reasonable prudent investor would want to know
before making his decision to purchase.
Q:
A:

[GUNNARSON] . . . Once again, material fact is something that any investor
would what?
[HINES] It's a fact any reasonable prudent investor would want to know before
they make their decision in purchasing.

See T.p. 90 (Emphasis added). Please also see p.91. According to the State, as soon as
someone offers to sell stock, he is required to disclose all "material facts". The State's view,
however, is clearly contrary to the requirements of §61-1-1(2). Rather than disclosing all facts
a reasonable prudent investor would want to know before he makes his decision in purchasing,
§61-1-1(2) only requires disclosures of material facts that would make any misleading
statements actually made by the defendant, not misleading.
30

But based on the State's erroneous view of the law, the State through Mr. Hines, told
the jury that Schwenke was a promoter and control person with a duty to made numerous
disclosures.
Q:
A:

[GUNNARSON] Based upon what you're heard today, how would you define
Mr. Schwenke's role?
[HINES] Well, it's my opinion that Mr. Schwenke acted as president or
corporate officer during a period of time, and was the major promoter of
the sale of the stock making him a control person. . . Then since he had
some ability to control the success or failure of the business venture, then
all material facts that relate to his ability or inability to be successful in that
transaction would need to be disclosed.

See T.p. 286. (Emphasis added). According to the State's erroneous view of the law,
Schwenke, as an alleged control person, failed to made numerous disclosures that are clearly
not within the purview and requirements of §61-1-1 (2) of the code. Mr. Hines told the jury that
the defendant should have made approximately twenty disclosures in connection with the
transaction in this case. The following are a few of the examples of the disclosures that Mr.
Hines told the jury that the Schwenke should have made; {See Fact #28 above for a lists of at
least 20 disclosures that the State claimed the defendant had a duty to make under the
statute.)
(1).

Schwenke's civil background

Q:

[GUNNARSON] How about civil backgrounds of control persons? Should
they be disclosed?
[HINES] Any fact dealing with the history of any civil litigation, criminal
litigation, regulatory administrative actions of control persons has to be
disclosed in connection with that offer or sale.

A:

See T.p. 96 (Emphasis added).
(2).

Schwenke's tax liens
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Q:
A:

[GUNNARSON] How about tax liens, would they be necessary to disclose by
a control person?
[NINES] It is my opinion that a tax lien would certainly be a material fact that
should be disclosed. It demonstrates the ability of the control person to be
subjected to potential civil litigation or the seizure of assets, and also
demonstrates their history of not properly paying taxes.

See T.p. 96 -97 (Emphasis added). Please also see p. 101.
(3)

Schwenke's disbarment

[GUNNARSON] Would the fact that a control person had been disbarred, in your
opinion, how would that relate to your term poison of the offering?
[HINES] The first issue I'd want to look at is the reason why the person was
disbarred. If it had anything to do with honesty or trust, then it certainly would be
a fact in my opinion that should be disclosed.
T.p. 101. (Emphasis added).
Contrary to the State's view, and under the plain meaning of the statute, the disclosures
are limited to material facts necessary to make a misleading statement of material fact actually
made by Schwenke, not misleading. The statute requires the State to first prove a true but
misleading statement of material fact actually made by Schwenke, then and only then, can the
State show statements of material facts that Schwenke omitted to make, but should have
made as to render the statement actually made, not misleading. Rather than staying within the
scope of the statute, the State created its own law and expanded the required disclosures to all
that a "reasonable prudent investor would want to know before thev make their decision in
purchasing." The State's erroneous view of the law was successfully argued to the court,
notwithstanding, the court noted that the statute does not define the terms "promoter" and
"control person";
[GUNNARSON] Your honor, the State's position is the same. Mr. Schwenke in his
motion argued credibility. That's a question for the jury. He argued that there
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were no predicate statements. I think weVe had abundant testimony as to
predicate statements and the fact of obligations of disclosures, the fact that he
was a promoter and the fact (inaudible) even a promoter that put upon him the
duty of all disclosure, which he breached. The fact that he didn't - he brought up
subjects such as risk [THE COURT] Well, promoter is not a defined term in the statute.
[GUNNARSON] No, but (inaudible) definition that he's a control person, and a
control person has that ~- according to Mr. Hines [THE COURT] Well, there's no - control person is not a defined in the statute
either.
[GUNNARSON] Well true, but then the expert testimony has been that (inaudible) is
he is a control person and a promoter, and they have the duty to disclose.
Beyond that, Mr. Hines has testified, and it's obvious for the jury that there is an
opening of the door when he talked about risk. Once you talk about risk you
better tell all the risks, and that includes conflicts, that includes background. That
includes the risk of the IPO. As a matter of fact, the IPO was, in Mr. Hines'
opinion, very probably would not have been granted, and that's something they
should have been told. So by opening the door and talking about the IPO, he
has to tell them the risks involved.
T.pp. 295-297. The State did not stop with the judge, it also argued the same erroneous view
of the law to the jury:
[GUNNARSON] You're entitled to know whatever a reasonable person would
consider important What would be considered important in this case? Risk,
once again. The IPO we talked about. The debt structure. The organization
itself, which was just a paper organization. It had no assets. A lie about the
assets.
The background of the individuals.
Johnson, the CEO, tax lien $201000.
Mr. Johnson, notice of federal tax lien, 160 - or $1,645,000. A million-and-a-half
dollars.
You're a disbarred attorney.
How about the fact that you have a tax lien against vou, Mr. Schwenke? I had it
right here in my hand If I recall — and he said approximately a half a million
dollars.
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See T.pp. 406-408.
Instead of prosecuting Schwenke under §61-1-1(2), the State created its own law calling
the defendant a promoter and control person, that offered stock, but failed to disclose all facts
a "reasonable prudent investor would want to know before thev make their decision in
purchasing." The State changed §61-1-1 from a requirement of disclosures limited to those
that would make any misleading statements made by Schwenke, not misleading, to
disclosures of any information a reasonable prudent investor would want to know. Obviously,
the State can't make up its own laws to put people in prison. But that is exactly what the State
did here, and doing so, the State has clearly violated Schwenke's constitutional right to due
process, and also by infringing on the powers of the legislature as discussed next.
A.

Constitutional due process violation

Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution provides, "No person shall be deprived of
life, liberty or property, without due process of law". Due process requires that "the defendant
receivefs] full notice of the charges, the elements, how the defendant's conduct amounts to a
crime. . ." Salazar v. Utah State Prison, 852 P.2d 988, 991 (Utah 1993). Here, Schwenke
received notice that he was charged with making misleading statements of material facts, and
he failed or omitted to state material facts necessary to make the misleading statements made,
not misleading. The states case presents two clear and undeniable constitutional due process
violations. First, the charge failed to provide notice of the allege misleading statements of
material facts that Schwenke made, nor was Schwenke given notice of statements of material
facts that he failed to make but should have made to make the misleading statements actually
made, not misleading. Under Salazar, supra, the State's failure to provide said notice is a
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constitutional due process violation. The second vioaltion is the State prosecuting Schwenke
of an entirely different charge than as alleged in the Information. The uncharged claim was
base on an allegation the Schwenke was a promoter and control person of Americandairy.com and had an alleged duty to disclose any information a reasonable prudent investor
would want to know. The uncharged claim is not a crime because it falls completely outside
the scope and requirements of §61-1-1(2). Accordingly, Schwenke had been prosecuted of a
charge that is not a crime and he was deprived any constitutional notice that he was going to
be so prosecuted. Accordingly, the defendant was denied constitutional due process notice of
the uncharged claim that he was prosecuted for.
The Constitutional due process issue in this case can also be reviewed from the
perspective that the statute, §61-1-1 (2), is void for vagueness, as applied by the State to
Schwenke. The United States Supreme Court has held that "[i]t is a basic principle of due
process that an enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined."
Gravned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972) (Emphasis added). Because of the
resulting due process violation, a criminal law can and often is invalidated for vagueness.
The United States Supreme Court provided two reasons where vagueness would
invalidate a criminal law, "[v]agueness may invalidate a criminal law for either of two
independent reasons. First, it may fail to provide the kind of notice that will enable ordinary
people to understand what conduct it prohibits; second, it may authorize and even encourage
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56 (1999)
(Emphasis added). Both of the reasons for invalidating a statute because of vagueness are
present in this case. The controlling statute provides in relevant parts,
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It is unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of any
security, directly or indirectly to: . . . (2). . .or omit to state a material fact necessary
in order to make the statement made, in light of the circumstances under which they
were made, not misleading.
Utah Code Ann. §61-1-1 (2) (Emphasis added). First, this statute does not provide adequate
notice that would enable ordinary people to understand what conduct is prohibited. One
interpretation which is supported by the plain meaning of the statute, provides that it is a
violation when the defendant made misleading statements of material facts, than failed to
make other statements of material facts that would make the misleading statements made, not
misleading. There is also another interpretation, aggressively enforced by the State, that
provides that the violation occurred when the defendant a promoter and control person failed
to disclose all information a reasonable prudent investor would want to know. These two views
are clearly inconsistent and in opposition to each other. Accordingly, when a statute can lead
to two diverse versions of its meaning, it is unlikely that it would be capable of providing
adequate notice to a reasonable person of it's meaning. Secondly, the State has clearly
demonstrated that under the language of §61-1-1(2), the State is authorized, and can enforce
its own view of the statute. And since the State can enforce its own view of the statute, it
certainly can, as it has done in this case, be arbitrary and discriminatory in its enforcement.
Because §61-1-1(2) leads to two diverse view of its meaning it is vague as applied in this case
and must accordingly be invalidated, and the honorable court is respectfully urged to do so.
B.

Constitutional Separation of Powers violation

The Utah Constitution, Article V, Section 1, provides that "[t]he powers of the
government of the State of Utah shall be divided into three distinct departments, the
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Legislature, the Executive and the Judicial; and no person charged with the exercise of powers
properly belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any function appertaining to
either of the others ...". The legislature, comprising of the House of Representative and the
Senate, has the legislative power. Utah Constitution Article VI, Section 1. Under it's legislative
power, the legislature enacted Utah Code Ann. §61-1-1(2) that the defendant was charged
with violating. As enacted by the legislature, §61-1-1(2) provided for very limited disclosures of
material facts. The State representing the Executive branch infringed upon the Legislature's
powers, and accordingly, violated the separation of powers clause of the Constitution by
creating its own law expanding the disclosure requirements of §61-1-1(2) to all information a
"reasonable prudent investor would want to know before they make their decision in
purchasing". Obviously, the State cannot do so, and doing so in this case has clearly resulted
in the jury wrongfully convicting the Schwenke for security fraud. Accordingly, the defendant
respectfully urged the honorable court to correct the injustice inflicted upon him, and
immediately reverse his wrongful conviction.
Point Four
Defendant was wrongfully convicted by the court allowing irrelevant,
prejudicial, and inflammatory evidence.
The charge of security fraud against defendant was based on an alleged sale of
American Dairy.com stock that closed or completed on August 9, 2000. The statute, Utah
Code Ann. §61-1-1(2) requires a finding of misleading statements made by defendant in
connection with this alleged August 9, 2000 sale. Additionally, once the misleading statement
is established, the State must then prove statements of material facts that were not made, but
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should have been made by Schwenke in order to make the misleading statements that were
made, not misleading. Both the misleading and omitted statements must be in connection with
the alleged August 9, 2000 sale agreement.
The three most inflammatory and prejudicial events presented to the jury as evidence in
this case had no bearing or connection whatsoever to the alleged August 9, 2000 stock sale
agreement. The first is a trust deed for $50,000.00 dated October 16, 2000, over two months
after the alleged stock sale Agreement. This evidence as shown next in Section A is false and
irrelevant and very prejudicial. The second is an alleged promise by defendant to pay for 200
cows delivered to the dairy farm about 30 days after the August 9, 2000 alleged stock sale
agreement. This evidence, as shown in Section B, is also false, irrelevant and very prejudicial.
Additionally, the State's expert witness gave impermissible and highly inflammatory testimony
concerning an IPO that was irrelevant and very prejudicial. That improper IPO testimony is
addressed in Section C.
A.

The evidence of the $50,000 trust deed is false, irrelevant, and very
prejudicial.

The State produced a Notice of Default (Exhibit #10) and Trust deed (Exhibit #9) and
through testimonies of Mr. Young and Mr. Myers made an outrageous claim that defendant
took $50,000.00 from the dairy farm.
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:

[GUNNARSON] What is that [Exhibit #10]
[YOUNG] It's a notice of default from PDN Investments.
[GUNNARSON] What did you think when you got a second notice of default?
[YOUNG] I thought it was a mistake.
[GUNNARSON] So you got the notice of default that says its in the amount of
$50.000.00. is that right?
[YOUNG] Yes
[GUNNARSON] Can you recall who got the $50,000.00?
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A:

[YOUNG]

Paul [defendant] did.

See T.p. 163 (Emphasis added)
Q:
A:

[GUNNARSON]
[YOUNG] No.

Did he spend any of it on the farm?

See T.p.164 (Emphasis added).
Q:

A:

Q:
Q:
G:
A:

[GUNNARSON] Did you ever authorized Mr. Schwenke through this proxy,
verbally, orally that he could take $50,000 out of the deed to your farm for
his corporation?
[MYERS] No, he never - that never - I never dreamed that would have
happened. I didn't think it could happen because I knew that Central Bank
had the first mortgage on that loan. I didn't know he could re- mortgage
that again.
[GUNNARSON] So he never told you he was going to take $5,000.00
personally out of it; is that correct?
[MYERS] Oh $5,000 personally?
[GUNNARSON] Or $50,000.00
[MYERS] No, No.

See T.pp. 277-278 (Emphasis added). Contrary to the testimonies, there was no evidence of a
note for $50,000.00, no evidence that the missing note was funded, and no evidence that
defendant took $50,000.00.
Q:

A:

[SCHWENKE] Okay. As a matter of fact, you don't have a note that in fact
was signed for this alleged loan, and top of that, you don't know if any - even if there was a note, whether there was any money paid on this note,
is that correct?
[YOUNG] That's true, I don't

See T.p. 187. (Emphasis added). In deed, but for ineffective assistance of counsel, bank
records and testimony from PDN Investments would have established that only $12,500.00
was funded on the loan. And notwithstanding, Mr. Young's denial of the loan, he personally
received $7,000.00, and the balance of $5,500.00 was paid on a $15,000 bill from cSave.net,
LLC that cleaned, painted the dairy, and installed the internet server, website and cameras
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throughout the dairy** as confirmed by Mr. Young at trial. Mr. Schwenke received no funds
whatsoever.
Q:

A:
Q:

[SCHWENKE] When you joined American Dairy com under the agreement,
your farm, according to the plan, was also then equipped with these
internet equipment, is that correct?
[YOUNG] Yes
[SCHWENKE] As a matter of fact, some people came over and clean the
place up and painted, help you with the - - putting a special room They
installed internet server, computer and stuff. All of that happened is that
correct?

A:

[YOUNG]

Yes

See T.pp. 189-190 (Emphasis added).
The evidence of the loan, and the charge that defendant took $50,000 personally from
the proceeds of the loan is absolutely false.9 Moreover, the loan was made over two months
after the August 9, 2000 alleged stock sale agreement; and accordingly, it had no bearing or
connection to alleged stock sale. The loan is therefore, not relevant to the allege security
fraud and should not have been presented to the jury The loan is not a statement of material
fact made by the defendant in connection with the August 9, 2000 agreement. The loan is not
an omission of a material fact that would have made any misleading statement made by the
defendant on or before August 9, 2000, not misleading. The allegation and the false evidence
that defendant took $50,000 from the farm is inflammatory and extremely prejudicial that it

Appellant was denied a remand to establish evidence of the loan including copies of the checks issued to
James Young and cSave.net, LLC and|he copies of the checks with the court order included herein m the
Addendum
9
ineffective assistance of counsel The defendant was incarcerated in August, 2005 and remained incarcerated at the time of
the trial in this case in June, 2007, and remained so until November 4, 2008 Accordingly, defendant was not available and
free to prepare for the trial As a result, defendant had to rely on his counsel to properly prepare for trail Early in the case,
defendant advised his attorney to visit with a Mr Bitton from Idaho and to subpoena him for the trial Defendant also asked his
attorney to subpoena all the records of the loan from PDN Investments At the morning of tnal, defendant was told by his
attorney that Mr Bitton was not coming to the tnal, and the PDN Investments record were not subpoenaed As a result of
counsel's failure to obtain the PDN Investment records, defendant was unable to establish the evidence of the loan at trial
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must have caused the jury to wrongfully convict the defendant. Therefore, this court is
respectfully urged to please correct this miscarriage of justice and restore defendant's freedom
by reversing and vacating defendant's wrongful conviction.
B.

The evidence that defendant promised to pay for the 200 cows is false,
irrelevant inflammatory and very prejudicial.

After the August 9, 2000 agreement, approximately 200 cows were delivered to the
dairy. The State through Mr. Young claims that defendant told Young to buy the cows, and
defendant failed to pay for them.
Q:
A:
Q:
A:

[SCHWENKE] Okay. You testified today that defendant told you to go and
buy 200 cows to put in the dairy; is that correct?
[YOUNG] Yes.
[SCHWENKE] Then the defendant didn't pay for the cows, and they got
repossessed, is that correct?
[YOUNG] Yes

See T.p.192 (Emphasis added). While Mr. Young claims that defendant was supposed to pay
for the cows, he acknowledged that defendant did not promise, or had any obligation under the
August 9, 2000 agreement to buy cows.
Q:

A:

[SCHWENKE] . . . It fthe August 9, 2000 agreement] doesn't say anything
about defendant having or promising or having any obligation to go buy
cows for this farm; is that correct?
[YOUNG] That's correct.

See T.p.192 (Emphasis added). According to the State, within 30 days after the August 9,
2000 agreement, the cows were delivered to the farm, and during the next 30 days the cows
were repossessed. See T.pp. 243-244. When the cows were repossessed, the dairy was
over.
Q:
A:

[GUNNARSON]
[MYERS] Yes

Were they fcows] ever repossessed?
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Q:
A:

[GUNNARSON] What happened to the finances of the farm after the cows
were taken back?
[MYERS] It was over. I mean we were struggling before this transaction. We
had put, I don't know, three months of feed into these cows, we had
calved them all out, just barely starting to get some milk flow out of them
to where they would have probably broke even and they were gone, and
we were done. I mean it was over.

See T.pp. 244-245 (Emphasis added).
The State put the blame on the defendant for the loss of the dairy farm. In deed, it must
have inflamed the jury enough to find defendant guilty of a crime he did not commit. Moreover,
the claim is clearly irrelevant. Defendant's allege promise to pay for the cows, even if it was
made, was not made until after the August 9, 2000 alleged stock sale agreement. Therefore, it
could not have been a misleading statement of a material fact made by defendant in
connection with the August 9, 2000 sale agreement. Furthermore, assuming arguendo, that
defendant made misleading statements, the promise to pay for the cows could not be a
statement of material fact that defendant omitted to make on or before August 9, 2000 that
could make any misleading statement, not misleading. The prejudicial impact of this
evidence, however, is plain and clear and must have caused the jury to convict defendant.
Accordingly, this court is again respectfully urged, for this additional ground, to reverse and
vacate the defendant's wrongful conviction.
C.

The State's expert witness gave impermissible testimony concerning an
IPO that was irrelevant inflammatory and very prejudicial.

This case does not involve an Initial Public Offering ("IPO") of stock. Indeed, even the
court acknowledged that the case does not involve an IPO:
[HARMON] You honor, again I'd like to pose an objection because I think that we're
going far a field to the facts of this case.
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[GUNNARSON] You honor, if I may respond.
[THE COURT] Go ahead.
[GUNNARSON] Your honor, if nothing else, this is foundational. I have documents
here that I'm going to have to admit sooner or later. This foundational. It goes
right to the heart of the case.
[THE COURT] Well, this case does not involve an IPO does it, Mr. Gunnarson?
T.p. 100 (Emphasis added.). Yet, prior to Mr. Harmon's objection, the State has presented
outrageously inflammatory testimony concerning an IPO and implying that Schwenke in this
case failed to make the disclosures required to sell stock, and that the sale of stock in this case
was poisoned by defendant's disbarment:
Q
A
Q
A
Q
A
Q

A:
Q:
A:

Q:
A:

[GUNNARSON] Are you familiar with the term initial public offering?
[HINES] Yes.
[GUNNARSON] What is - is it call and IPO?
[HINES] Yes, that's an IPO.
[GUNNARSON] IPO.
[HINES] Right.
[GUNNARSON] Don't want to be too confusing (inaudible) I could never
speak military because they have too may acronyms, so I'll continue to
call it an initial public offering, okay? What is necessary for someone to
obtain - well, first of all, what is an initial public offering? How does it
come about?
[HINES] That is the initial introduction of the stock from the issuer to the
general public.
[GUNNARSON] What is necessary in order for the issuer to introduce stock
to the general public?
[HINES] The issuer is going to have to either do a registration or find some
circumstances under which they are exempt from registration. The
majority of the ones we're seeing now fall under what's call 506 (inaudible)
offerings. After they handle their registration issues, if we assume it's an
offering with a company that has $25 million or less in income, they could
qualify for SB-10 regulations, and they then will need to find an
underwriter to sell those stocks. The duty of the underwriter is - normally
is to take the entire quantity of stock and to sell it in the secondary market,
but an underwriter can also elect to take part of that stock and sell it and
not take the risk of possessing all the stock.
[GUNNARSON] What I hear you saying - tell me if I'm wrong - is that an
underwriter sells so that he sponsors the stock?
[HINES] That's correct.
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Q:

A:

Q:
A:
Q:
A:

Q:
A:
Q:
A:

Q:
A:

Q:
A:
G:

[GUNNARSON] What is -- in your experience, what is necessary for an
underwriter to know in order to determine whether or not that person will
sponsor the stock and present it to the public?
[HINE] Well, what an underwriter is going to do is tremendous amount of
basically boilerplate due diligence concerning the requirements for
disclosure, including risk, capitalization, distribution, commissions to be
paid, background of the principals and control persons involved in the
issuing company.
[GUNNARSON] Are there times in which an underwriter refuses to sponsor
stock?
[HINES] Oh, absolutely, yes.
[GUNNARSON] What would the reasons, in your experience, be that would
happen?
[HINES] Well, certainly if there's - an underwriter may put a lot of weight on
the fact that there's so much competition in the market doing the very
same thing that it is unlikely he can sell the stock. Well, certainly one of
the areas that underwriters look at that the industry recognizes poisoning
the issue is if there is significant discipline history or other history of
principals involved and control persons involved in the issuing of the stock,
then underwriters know that those facts have to be disclosed to potential
investors, and so they'll have a tendency to back down from those
offerings.
[GUNNARSON] Would those - now you use the term "poison." What do you
mean by —
[HINES] That's an industry term that we use in our NASA meetings.
[GUNNARSON] Which means what?
[HINES] Basically it's probably going to bar an underwriter from taking that to a
secondary market and selling that stock. They're not going to sell it and
they're going to turn down this underwriting because of that fact.
[GUNNARSON]
Is there a registration document that must be filled out?
[HINES] Well, depending on whether you're filing for an exemption from
registration or are registering the product yourself, the majority of the
transactions states deal with are exempt transactions, and so they don't
have to file registration. They may have to file some notice with the State,
though.
[GUNNARSON] Coming back to your idea of poison, there were two words,
poison something.
[HINES] Poison the offering
[GUNNARSON] Poison - three words, poison the offering. Poisoning the
offering, you indicated there were certain thing that an underwriter would
consider very serious. Give me an idea of what those things would be.
How about tax liens on the control person of the corporation. Would that
be considered?
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See T.pp. 97-100. (Emphasis added). And even after Mr. Harmon's objection, the court still
allowed State to continue with irrelevant IPO testimony, and even stating that defendant's
disbarment poisoned the offering in this case.
Q:
A:

Q:
A:

[GUNNARSON] Would the fact that a control person had been disbarred, in
your opinion, how would that relate to your term poison of the offering?
[HINES] The first issue I'd want to look at is the reason why the person was
disbarred. If it had anything to do with honesty or trust, then it certainly
would be a fact, in my opinion, that should be disclosed.
[GUNNARSON]
Tax liens?
[HINES] Tax liens of the control person, again, I think are very important facts
for an investor to know and to give them - the investor can give that fact
the amount of weight that they think it deserves, but it's my opinion that it
should be disclosed.

See T.p.101. The court also allowed the State to continue with irrelevant IPO guestions when
the State questioned Mr. Drage.
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:

[GUNNARSON] Let's talk about the IPO, the initial public offering.
[DRAGE] Yes sir.
[GUNNARSON] You indicated that if there is an initial public offering there has
to be tremendous disclosures, right?
[DRAGE] Yes, at the time of the IPO.
[GUNNARSON] Okay. That would have included Mr. Schwenke's
disbarment?
[DRAGE] I don't know, It didn't happen, so [GUNNARSON] No, I'm just talking about - you know how an IPO works?
[DRAGE] Perfectly.
[GUNNARSON] Okay. In that case, if there had been an IPO, it would have
disclosed Mr. Schwenke's disbarment, correct?
[DRAGE] If there had been an IPO on August 12th or 18th, whenever they
signed it, yeah.
[GUNNARSON] Okay. It would have had to disclose his tax liens, correct?
[DRAGE] I'd have to take a look at that. Maybe not the tax liens.
[GUNNARSON] Mr. Schwenke or Mr. Johnson's tax liens of over a million
dollars?
[DRAGE] Maybe no.
[GUNNARSON] He signed as the CEO of the corporation.
[DRAGE] You're asking me about if an IPO took place, but there - an IPO
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didn't take place.
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[GUNNARSON] Okay. Hypothetical, there was an IPO issued, okay. Would
the issuer had been informed about Mr. Schwenke's disbarment?
[DRAGE] If the issuer had done an IPO they wouldn't have them as officers,
probably.
[GUNNARSON] Because they would know about that, correct?
[DRAGE] To - well, for -- to make sure that there weren't any legal
entanglements.
[GUNNARSON] Exactly, It's important in an IPO to give all the backgrounds of
the principals, correct?
[DRAGE] At the time of the IPO.
[GUNNARSON] Yes.
[DRAGE] Yes
[GUNNARSON] Does it include the disbarment?
[DRAGE] It could, yes.
[GUNNARSON] Would it have included the disciplinary proceeding
against Mr. Johnson [DRAGE] No.
[GUNNARSON] - and his bar?
[DRAGE] No.
[GUNNARSON] Would you have included tax loan - or liens?
[DRAGE] I'd have to analyze that. Possibly not.
[GUNNARSON] Probably so, in your experience?
[DRAGE] I'd have to re-read it
[GUNNARSON] Okay. How about civil judgments against one of the
principals?
[DRAGE] Only if it involved issue of honesty. In other words, it could be a DUI.
It's just not going to be an item.
[GUNNARSON] Civil judgment of a substantial amount?
[DRAGE] Well, I mean he might have violated a - I don't know. He could have
broken - breached a contract. That doesn't necessarily mean that that's
something that has to be disclosed.
[GUNNARSON] Financial status has to be disclosed, correct?
[DRAGE] No
[GUNNARSON] Financial status doesn't - [DRAGE] Of an individual? No. Only bankruptcy, if there's been a bankruptcy
filed in the last five years.
[GUNNARSON] An underwriter wouldn't be interested to know that one of the
principals has a judgment over their head for so many hundreds of
thousands of dollars?
[DRAGE] Well (inaudible) an underwriter might want to know, but it's not
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required to be put in there. The statutory requirement is that if there's
been a bankruptcy in the last five years then you disclose it, otherwise
there's not a disclosure.
[GUNNARSON] The purpose of having an underwriter is the underwriter looks
at the initial public offering and makes sure that all the proper disclosures
are there, correct?
[DRAGE] No, the purpose of the underwriter is to go get the money.
[GUNNARSON] Okay, but he's also responsible for making sure that all the
disclosures are there or he wouldn't underwrite it?
[DRAGE] They are also responsible for the disclosures, correct.
[GUNNARSON] Right, or they wouldn't underwrite it.
[DRAGE] Correct.
[GUNNARSON] And those disclosures would be anything that an investor
would think significant or important in making their decision as to whether
to invest, correct.
[DRAGE] They would analyze it that way.
[GUNNARSON] Okay. The background-[HARMON] I'd like to object at this point to this whole line of questioning
because we're talking about hypothetical and we're talking about an IPO.
There's never been any proof in this case that there ever was an IPO.
[GUNNARSON] Your honor, may - I'm sorry.
[THE COURT] Go ahead, Mr. Gunnarson.
[GUNNARSON] If the jury finds that there was more than just a mere change
of ownership, then they're entitled to go into every misrepresentation and
every omission from there. That's a question of the jury. Just because it
was not issued doesn't mean that they can't consider it.
[THE COURT] Overruled. I find it to be a proper hypothetical. Go ahead.

T.P.357-360 (Emphasis added)
By overruling the objection, the court allowed the jury to consider the repeated
misstatement of the law by Mr. Gunnarson, f"lf the jury finds that there was more than just a
mere change of ownership, then they're entitled to go into every misrepresentation and every
omission from there." T.p.360 (Emphasis added).]10, and accept as evidence the State's
frequent statement that the defendant's disbarment, his tax liens and judgments must be

Gunnarson 's argument is frivolous because Mr. Young testified that the transaction was a mere change of
form of the business from a limited liability company to a corporation.
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disclosed. The State's unlawful tactics must not be allowed and this court is respectfully urged
to correct this miscarriage of justice and reverse the conviction. The law is clear that the only
disclosures required under §61-1-1(2) are those that would make a misleading statement
made by the defendant not misleading rather than disclosures of all facts a reasonable prudent
investor would want to know.
CONCLUSION
The State charged defendant with violation of Utah Code Ann. §61-1-1(2), but
prosecuted him with a completely different version of the statute. §61-1-1(2) requires proof
that defendant made misleading statements of material facts, and failed to make statements of
material facts that would make the misleading statements that he made, not misleading. The
State failed to establish any misleading statements made by the defendant,
instead, the State told the jury of as many as 20 disclosures that the defendant omitted to
make. Without misleading statements made by defendant, the jury was left with 20 or so
omissions without any misleading statements to attach to. That is a major hole in the State's
case and another reason for the court to reverse Schwenke's conviction. Additionally, the
economic reality of the issuance of American Dairy.com stock, confirms that there had been no
offer or sale of a security in this case as charged by the State. United House Foundation v.
Foreman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975). On top of it all, there was no offer or sale of security for value
as Mr. Young confirmed that the transaction was merely a change of form of the business from
a limited liability company to a corporation.
Moreover, the State's expert gave impermissible legal conclusion that the American
Dairy.com stock issued to Mr. Young and Mr. Myers was security. That impermissible legal
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opinion compels reversal of the defendant's conviction. State v. Davis, 155 P.3d 909 (Ut. Ct.
App. 2007). Couple with an impermissible legal conclusion, the State also presented the jury
with an erroneous statement of the law claiming that once the defendant offer or sold American
Diary.com stock that he had a duty to disclose all facts a "reasonable prudent investor would
want to know before they make their decision in purchasing." The impermissible legal
conclusion and the erroneous view of the statute are grounds for reversal of the conviction,
accordingly, the defendant respectfully urged the honorable court to do so, and immediately
vacate the wrongful conviction and order Schwenke's freedom.
Finally, the conviction should be reversed on the additional ground that the court
allowed irrelevant, inflammatory and prejudicial evidence of an allege $50,000.00 loan,
repossession of 200 cows, and a nonexisting initial public offering.
For all the foregoing reasons, Schwenke respectfully prays the honorable court would
reverse his wrongful conviction and order his immediate freedom.
Dated this J_ day of f^btuaty, 2009.

A. Pab\ Schwenke,
Appellant Pro Se
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused to be hand-delivered, two true and exact copies of the
foregoing Brief of Appellant to: Ms. Kris C. Leonard, Esq., Assistant Attorney General, at 160
East 300 South, 6th Fl., P.O. Box 140854, SLC, UT. 84114-0854 this _5

A. Paiil Schwenke
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ADDENDUM

1.

Controlling law; constitution,
statutes, and rules:

Article V, Section 1, HThree departments of government!
The powers of the government of the State of Utah shali be divided into three distinct
departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; and no person charged
with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments, shall
exercise any functions appertaining to either of the others, except in the cases herein
expressly directed or permitted.
Article YI8, Section 1. [Executive Department officers — Terms, residence, and
duties.]
(1) The elective constitutional officers of the Executive Department shall consist of
Governor, Lieutenant Governor, State Auditor, State Treasurer, and Attorney General.
(2) Each officer shall:
(a) hold office for four years beginning on the first Monday of January next after their
election;
(b) during their terms of office reside within the state; and
(c) perform such duties as are prescribed by this Constitution and as provided by
statute.
81 -1 - 1 ,

Fraud unlawful.

It is unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer, sale, or purchase of any
security, directly or indirectly to:
(1) employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud;
(2) make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they are made, not misleading; or
(3) engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person.
76-6-405. Theft by deception,
(1) A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises control over property of another
by deception and with a purpose to deprive him thereof.
(2) Theft by deception does not occur, however, when there is only falsity as to
matters having no pecuniary significance, or puffing by statements unlikely to deceive
ordinary persons in the group addressed. "Puffing" means an exaggerated
commendation of wares or worth in communications addressed to the public or to a
class or group.
78A-4-103,

Court of Appeals jurisdiction.

(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to issue
all writs and process necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or

o

(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of
state agencies or appeals from the district court review of informal adjudicative
proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax
Commission, School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of
Forestry, Fire and State Lands actions reviewed by the executive director of the
Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state
engineer;
(b) appeals from the district court review of:
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of the state or other
local agencies; and
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63G-3-6G2;
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, except those
involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a
conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony;
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by persons who
are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting a
challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a first degree or capital felony;
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the
decisions of the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first degree or
capital felony;
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but not
limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child custody, support, parent-time,
visitation, adoption, and paternity;
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court.
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four judges of
the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate review and
determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has original appellate
jurisdiction.
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63G, Chapter 4,
Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.
Rule 3. Appeat as of right: how taken,
(a) Filing appeal from final orders and judgments. An appeal may be taken from a
district or juvenile court to the appellate court with jurisdiction over the appeal from all
final orders and judgments, except as otherwise provided by law, by filing a notice of
appeal with the clerk of the trial court within the time allowed by Rule 4. Failure of an
appellant to take any step other than the timely filing of a notice of appeal does not
affect the validity of the appeal, but is ground only for such action as the appellate court
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deems appropriate, which may include dismissal of the appeal or other sanctions short
of dismissal, as well as the award of attorney fees.
(b) Joint or consolidated appeals. If two or more parties are entitled to appeal from a
judgment or order and their interests are such as to make joinder practicable, they may
file a joint notice of appeal or may join in an appeal of another party after filing separate
timely notices of appeal. Joint appeals may proceed as a single appeal with a single
appellant. Individual appeals may be consolidated by order of the appellate court upon
its own motion or upon motion of a party, or by stipulation of the parties to the separate
appeals.
(c) Designation of parties. The party taking the appeal shall be known as the appellant
and the adverse party as the appellee. The title of the action or proceeding shall not be
changed in consequence of the appeal, except where otherwise directed by the
appellate court, in original proceedings in the appellate court, the party making the
original application shall be known as the petitioner and any other party as the
respondent.
(d) Content of notice of appeal. The notice of appeal shall specify the party or parties
taking the appeal; shall designate the judgment or order, or part thereof, appealed from;
shall designate the court from which the appeal is taken; and shall designate the court
to which the appeal is taken.
(e) Service of notice of appeal. The party taking the appeal shall give notice of the filing
of a notice of appeal by serving personally or mailing a copy thereof to counsel of record
of each party to the judgment or order; or, if the party is not represented by counsel,
then on the party at the party's last known address. A certificate evidencing such service
shall be filed with the notice of appeal. If counsel of record is served, the certificate of
service shall designate the name of the party represented by that counsel.
(f) Filing fee in civil appeals. At the time of filing any notice of separate, joint, or cross
appeal in a civil case, the party taking the appeal shall pay to the clerk of the trial court
the filing fee established by law. The clerk of the trial court shall not accept a notice of
appeal regardless of whether the filing fee has been paid. Failure to pay the filing fee
within a reasonable time may result in dismissal.
(g) Docketing of appeal. Upon the filing of the notice of appeal, the clerk of the trial court
shall immediately transmit a certified copy of the notice of appeal, showing the date of
its filing, and a statement by the clerk indicating whether the filing fee was paid and
whether the cost bond required by Rule 6 was filed. Upon receipt of the copy of the
notice of appeal, the clerk of the appellate court shall enter the appeal upon the docket.
An appeal shall be docketed under the title given to the action in the trial court, with the
appellant identified as such, but if the title does not contain the name of the appellant,
such name shall be added to the title.
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Rule 4. Appeal as of right: when taken.
(a) Appeal from finai judgment and order. In a case in which an appeal is permitted as a
matter of right from the trial court to the appellate court, the notice of appeal required by
Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 30 days after the date of entry
of the judgment or order appealed from. However, when a judgment or order is entered
in a statutory forcible entry or unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal required by
Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 10 days after the date of entry
of the judgment or order appealed from.
(b) Time for appeal extended by certain motions.
(b)(1) If a party timely files in the trial court any of the following motions, the time for all
parties to appeal from the judgment runs from the entry of the order disposing of the
motion:
(b)(1)(A) a motion for judgment under Rule 50(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure;
(b)(1)(B) a motion to amend or make additional findings of fact, whether or not an
alteration of the judgment would be required if the motion is granted, under Rule 52(b)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure;
(b)(1)(C) a motion to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure;
(b)(1)(D) a motion for a new trial under Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; or
(b)(1)(E) a motion for a new trial under Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
(b)(2) A notice of appeal filed after announcement or entry of judgment, but before entry
of an order disposing of any motion listed in Rule 4(b), shall be treated as filed after
entry of the order and on the day thereof, except that such a notice of appeal is effective
to appeal only from the underlying judgment. To appeal from a final order disposing of
any motion listed in Rule 4(b), a party must file a notice of appeal or an amended notice
of appeal within the prescribed time measured from the entry of the order.(c) Filing prior
to entry of judgment or order. A notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a
decision, judgment, or order but before entry of the judgment or order shall be treated
as filed after such entry and on the day thereof.
(d) Additional or cross-appeal. If a timely notice of appeal is filed by a party, any other
party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date on which the first notice of
appeal was filed, or within the time otherwise prescribed by paragraphs (a) and (b) of
this rule, whichever period last expires.
(e) Extension of time to appeal. The trial court, upon a showing of excusable neglect or
good cause, may extend the time for filing a notice of appeal upon motion filed not later
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than 30 days after the expiration of the time prescribed by paragraphs (a) and (b) of this
rule. A motion filed before expiration of the prescribed time may be ex parte unless the
trial court otherwise requires. Notice of a motion filed after expiration of the prescribed
time shall be given to the other parties in accordance with the rules of practice of the
trial court. No extension shall exceed 30 days past the prescribed time or 10 days from
the date of entry of the order granting the motion, whichever occurs later.
(f) Motion to reinstate period for filing a direct appeal in criminal cases. Upon a showing
that a criminal defendant was deprived of the right to appeal, the trial court shall
reinstate the thirty-day period for filing a direct appeal. A defendant seeking such
reinstatement shall file a written motion in the sentencing court and serve the
prosecuting entity. If the defendant is not represented and is indigent, the court shall
appoint counsel. The prosecutor shall have 30 days after service of the motion to file a
written response. If the prosecutor opposes the motion, the trial court shall set a hearing
at which the parties may present evidence. If the trial court finds by a preponderance of
the evidence that the defendant has demonstrated that he was deprived of his right to
appeal, it shall enter an order reinstating the time for appeal. The defendant's notice of
appeal must be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 30 days after the date of entry
of the order.
(g) Appeal by an Inmate Confined in an Institution. If an inmate confined in an institution
files a notice of appeal in either a civil or criminal case, the notice of appeal is timely
filed if it is deposited in the institution's internal mail system on or before the last day for
filing. Timely filing may be shown by a notarized statement or written declaration setting
forth the date of deposit and stating that first-class postage has been prepaid. If a notice
of appeal is filed in the manner provided in this paragraph (f), the 14-day period
provided in paragraph (d) runs from the date when the trial court receives the first notice
of appeal.
Rule 702, Testimony by experts.
(a) Subject to the limitations in subsection (b), if scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact
in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
(b) Scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge may serve as the basis for
expert testimony if the scientific, technical, or other principles or methods underlying the
testimony meet a threshold showing that they (i) are reliable, (ii) are based upon
sufficient facts or data, and (iii) have been reliably applied to the facts of the case.
(c) The threshold showing required by subparagraph (b) is satisfied if the principles or
methods on which such knowledge is based, including the sufficiency of facts or data
and the manner of their application to the facts of the case, are generally accepted by
the relevant expert community.
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Advisory Committee Note.
Apart from its introductory clause, part (a) of the amended Rule recites verbatim Federal
Rule 702 as it appeared before it was amended in 2000 to respond to Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). The 2007 amendment to the Rule
added that introductory clause, along with parts (b) and (c). Unlike its predecessor, the
amended rule does not incorporate the text of the Federal Rule. Although Utah law
foreshadowed in many respects the developments in federal law that commenced with
Daubert, the 2007 amendment preserves and clarifies differences between the Utah
and federal approaches to expert testimony.
The amended rule embodies several general considerations. First, the rule is intended
to be applied to all expert testimony. In this respect, the rule follows federal law as
announced in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). Next, like its federal
counterpart, Utah's rule assigns to trial judges a "gatekeeper" responsibility to screen
out unreliable expert testimony. In performing their gatekeeper function, trial judges
should confront proposed expert testimony with rational skepticism. This degree of
scrutiny is not so rigorous as to be satisfied only by scientific or other specialized
principles or methods that are free of controversy or that meet any fixed set of criteria
fashioned to test reliability. The rational skeptic is receptive to any plausible evidence
that may bear on reliability. She is mindful that several principles, methods or
techniques may be suitably reliable to merit admission into evidence for consideration
by the trier of fact. The fields of knowledge which may be drawn upon are not limited
merely to the "scientific" and "technical", but extend to all "specialized" knowledge.
Similarly, the expert is viewed, not in a narrow sense, but as a person qualified by
"knowledge, skill, experience, training or education". Finally, the gatekeeping trial judge
must take care to direct her skepticism to the particular proposition that the expert
testimony is offered to support. The Daubert court characterized this task as focusing on
the "work at hand". The practitioner should equally take care that the proffered expert
testimony reliably addresses the "work at hand", and that the foundation of reliability
presented for it reflects that consideration.
Section (c) retains limited features of the traditional Frye test for expert testimony.
Generally accepted principles and methods may be admitted based on judicial notice.
The nature of the "work at hand" is especially important here. It might be important in
some cases for an expert to educate the factfinder about general principles, without
attempting to apply these principles to the specific facts of the case. The rule recognizes
that an expert on the stand may give a dissertation or exposition of principles relevant to
the case, leaving the trier of fact to apply them to the facts. Proposed expert testimony
that seeks to set out relevant principles, methods or techniques without offering an
opinion about how they should be applied to a particular array of facts will be, in most
instances, more eligible for admission under section (c) than case specific opinion
testimony. There are, however, scientific or specialized methods or techniques applied
at a level of considerable operational detail that have acquired sufficient general
acceptance to merit admission under section (c).
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The concept of general acceptance as used in section (c) is intended to replace the
novel vs. non-novel dichotomy that has served as a central analytical tool in Utah's Rule
702 jurisprudence. The failure to show general acceptance meriting admission under
section (c) does not mean the evidence is inadmissible, only that the threshold showing
for reliability under section (b) must be shown by other means.
Section (b) adopts the three general categories of inquiry for expert testimony contained
in the federal rule. Unlike the federal rule, however, the Utah rule notes that the
proponent of the testimony is required to make only a "threshold" showing. That
"threshold" requires only a basic foundational showing of indicia of reliability for the
testimony to be admissible, not that the opinion is indisputably correct. When a trial
court, applying this amendment, rules that an expert's testimony is reliable, this does not
necessarily mean that contradictory expert testimony is unreliable. The amendment is
broad enough to permit testimony that is the product of competing principles or methods
in the same field of expertise. Contrary and inconsistent opinions may simultaneously
meet the threshold; it is for the factfinder to reconcile - or choose between - the different
opinions. As such, this amendment is not intended to provide an excuse for an
automatic challenge to the testimony of every expert, and it is not contemplated that
evidentiary hearings will be routinely required in order for the trial judge to fulfill his role
as a rationally skeptical gatekeeper. In the typical case, admissibility under the rule may
be determined based
Rule 704. Opinion on ultimate issue.
(a) Except as provided in subparagraph (b), testimony in the form of an opinion or
inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate
issue to be decided by the trier of fact.
(b) No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or condition of a
defendant in a criminal case may state an opinion or inference as to whether the
defendant did or did not have the mentai state or condition constituting an element of
the crime charged or of a defense thereto. Such ultimate issues are matters for the trier
of fact alone.
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Schwenke's motion asserts that his trial counsel was
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a tr tst deed and subpoena bank documents to demonstrate that he
rece .ved no money from the alleged loan; (2) obtain documents and
call witnesses regarding the value of the dairy; and (3) subpoena
irfermati.on as to whether certain individuals may have, received
vicl. ns' reparation funds or promises of compensation that may
have biased their- testimony. Schwenke does not provide properly
supported, nonspeculative facts necessary to sustain his
assertions- Thus, his claims do not warrant remand under rule
23B.
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Drexel
Goldman
Funding, Inc.

October 18, 2000

Attn- Tim Willardson
Fr:

Corey Nance

Re*

Nance / Bonneville Investment Group / American-Dairy.com

Dear Tim.
Please take a look at these and the threats of this psycho attorney, Paul Schwenke
I entered into a loan agreement lending $25,000 to this guy to shore up my position against this
dairy for mone> that was previously owed me as well as helping this attorney with S for a much
larger deal not related to the dairy
My letter to him states that I deem myself insecure due to information he made availble about
himself in an unrelated business meeting Monday. At this pomt I v/as not comfortable with paying
thebalance of the money $12,500.00
Piease review his threats vs my recorded 2nd position lien and let me know what I should do.
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